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COMPENSATION AND VALUATION FOR
REGULATORY TAKINGS
INTRODUCTION
The constitutional status of restrictive governmental land use regulations
is one of the most controversial issues in contemporary American land use
law.' Courts and commentators disagree on the propriety of allowing mon-
etary compensation when land use regulation2 unconstitutionally restricts the
use of private property.' Two opposing constitutional interpretations are
involved in this debate. One view holds that overly restrictive land use
regulations constitute a de facto taking of private property for which the
fifth amendment requires just compensation.4 The opposing view holds that
overly restrictive land use regulations are an invalid exercise of the police
power that violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Therefore, according to this view, the proper remedy is not compensation,
but invalidation of the offending regulation.'
The leading statement on the issue of whether monetary compensation is
an appropriate remedy for unconstitutionally restrictive land use regulations
is contained in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego.6 According to Justice Brennan, once a
court identifies a regulatory taking, the fifth amendment demands that
compensation be paid to the landowner, even in cases of a "temporary
taking" where the offending ordinance is ultimately rescinded. 7 Justice Bren-
nan's dissent was joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell.' Signif-
icantly, Justice Rehnquist also expressed his agreement with the above portion
of Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in a concurring opinion in which he
agreed with the plurality that the absence of a final state court judgment
1. For a sampling of various viewpoints on the controversy over the proper remedy in
cases of unconstitutional land use regulations, see Constitutional Issues in Land Use Regulation,
8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517 (1981). For an overview of the American land use system, see A.
DAWSON, LAND USE PLANNING AND THE LAW (1982); R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND USE
CONTROLS (1981).
2. The term "land use regulation" as used in this Comment refers to any land use control
law or zoning ordinance.
3. As opposed to the broader question of when a land use regulation will be held to
constitute a de facto regulatory taking, this Comment is concerned with the issue of whether
compensation should be awarded once a regulatory taking has occurred.
4. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
6. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
7. Id. at 655 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8. Id.
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required dismissal of the appeal. 9 Consequently, the compensation remedy
proposed by the dissent in San Diego was sanctioned by an indirect majority
of five justices of the Supreme Court. 0 Nevertheless, the compensation
remedy proposed by Justice Brennan is not a conclusive holding of the
Court. Because the majority in San Diego dismissed the appeal, the com-
pensation remedy proposed by the dissent may be cited as merely persuasive
authority by lower courts."
The United States Supreme Court is apparently undaunted by its inability
to conclusively resolve the compensation issue. Since 1980, the Court has
reviewed four regulatory inverse condemnation cases."2 In each of these four
cases, the Court side-stepped the compensation issue by dismissing the case
on procedural grounds. 3 Simultaneous with announcing its decision in the
two most recent regulatory inverse condemnation cases, the Court agreed to
hear in its next term a case attempting to present the same questions. 4 The
failure of the Supreme Court to conclusively resolve the compensation issue
has resulted in confusion among state and federal courts. While some courts
are receptive to a landowner's claim for just compensation, other courts
refuse to award compensation and limit the landowner's remedy to invali-
dation of the offending regulation.' 6 The unfairness in the current state of
the law to municipal regulatory entities, developers, and other landowners
necessitates a conclusive resolution by the Supreme Court of the controversy
surrounding the proper remedy in cases of overly restrictive land use regu-
lations.
9. Id. at 633 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
10. Id.
I1. Id. In San Diego, a majority of the Court concluded that the California courts had not
decided whether any taking had occurred and that the absence of a final state court judgment
required dismissal of the appeal. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
12. MacDonald, Sommen & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986); Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985);
San Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
13. See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
14. On July 28, 1985, the same day that the Supreme Court's decision in Williamson County
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985), was
announced, an appeal to the Supreme Court was filed in the case of MacDonald, Sommen &
Frater v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986). Similarly, on June 25, 1986, the same day that
the Court's decision in Yolo County was announced, the Court agreed to review First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 52 (1986), a
case that attempts to present the same issue of whether compensation is a proper remedy for
regulatory inverse condemnation. The Court also granted certiorari on October 13, 1986, in
Nollaw v. California Coastal Comm'n, 102 S. Ct. 312 (1986). The Nollaw case involves the
question of when excessive regulation under the police power constitutes a taking. Accordingly,
the stage is once again set for the Court to resolve this important issue.
15. See infra note 51.
16. Id.
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Resolution of this question must ultimately involve a careful balancing of
competing public policy concerns regarding the availability of a compensation
remedy. Persuasive policy arguments support both the invalidation and
compensation positions. 7 Therefore, both academia and the bar must con-
tinue to evaluate Justice Brennan's proposed compensation rule and further
develop the parameters of a compensation remedy in anticipation of a
conclusive Supreme Court decision. Because awarding monetary relief in
land use cases is a relatively recent development in the law, courts have not
yet developed adequate guidelines to use in measuring a compensation rem-
edy.'8 Indeed, valuation problems become increasingly important as a com-
pensation remedy gains acceptance in the courts.
This Comment addresses the basic considerations and the relevant under-
lying legal doctrines necessary to provide an understanding of the compen-
sation controversy. Also, the propriety of a compensation remedy as opposed
to an invalidation remedy is considered. The parameters of the compensation
remedy proposed by Justice Brennan in his San Diego dissent are then
explored. Finally, a number of valuation methods for determining the proper
measure of a just compensation remedy are discussed.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Doctrinal Considerations
Underlying the controversy of which remedies should be available to
property owners subject to unconstitutionally restrictive land use regulations
is the tension between the government's police power authority to regulate
land use for the public welfare and the protection accorded private property
by the fifth amendment's just compensation clause.' 9 Governments possess
police power authority to regulate land use for the public health, safety and
general welfare. 20 Generally, when a government restricts the use of private
property pursuant to its police power by enacting zoning ordinances or other
land use control laws, it need not compensate the landowner monetarily. 2'
Possessing the sovereign power of eminent domain, the government may
appropriate private property for public use. 22
17. See infra notes 103-21 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
19. See Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages
Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1982) (discussing tension
between eminent domain or taking power, which requires compensation, and police power,
which involves regulation of land use without compensation).
20. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1973); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
21. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922). See generally E. FREUND,
THE POLICE POWER § 511 (1904).
22. 1 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 [2] (J. Sackman rev. 3d ed. 1983).
See also Comment, Regulation of Land Use: From Magna Carta to Just Formulation, 23
19861
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However, the fifth amendment requires that the government compensate
owners of property condemned through the government's exercise of its
eminent domain power. 23 Regulation of land under the police power is
therefore distinguishable from the exercise of the power of eminent domain
in that the Constitution requires compensation to the owner of the property
affected by eminent domain, yet there is no such requirement with respect
to the police power. 24 Although the police power regulation of land is
distinguishable from formal condemnation under the power of eminent
domain, a land use regulation may so infringe upon the landowner's use
and enjoyment of a property right that the practical effect is the same. 25 In
other words, the regulation may invade the individual's private property
rights to the extent that it constitutes a de facto taking of private property
for public use without payment of just compensation. 26 When such a taking
occurs, the question arises whether the landowner may bring an inverse
comdemnation 27 claim for monetary compensation.
UCLA L. REV. 904, 904 n.4 (1976) (discussing historical application of just compensation clause
and its modern application in context of land use regulation). For current scholarship on the
fifth amendment's takings clause, see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (doctrinal analysis of takings clause concerned with reconciliation
of functions of state and limitations upon its power, with respect to individuals, imposed by
fifth amendment). Cf. Note, Richard Epstein on the Foundations of Takings Jurisprudence,
99 HARV. L. REV. 791 (1986) (critical of Epstein's analysis).
23. The fifth amendment provides "nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although provisions similar to the fifth
amendment exist in virtually every state constitution, twenty-five states have broader provisions
that require compensation where property is taken or damaged. 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 22,
§ 6.1 [3]. See Kratovil, Eminent Domain Revisited and Some Land Use Problems, 34 DEPAUL
L. REV. 587 (1985) (discussing development of Constitutional provisions in context of inverse
condemnation). See also Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative Pro-
spectus, 8 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 15 (1967) ("or damaged" clauses included in state
constitutions to enlarge compensation beyond court-imposed physical invasion requirements for
takings).
Both the fifth and the fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution are involved
in the compensation issue. The fifth amendment binds the federal government directly. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment, binding on the states, provides that no person
shall be deprived of "property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The
Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporates
the fifth amendment's compensation requirement for the taking of private property for public
use. Webbs Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Chicago B. & Q.
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). Thus, the fifth amendment's compensation require-
ment binds both federal and state governments. For the sake of brevity, this Comment will
simply refer to the fifth amendment when discussing the compensation requirement, without
the additional reference to the fourteenth amendment, with the understanding that the states
are bound by the substance of the fifth amendment's just compensation clause.
24. See supra notes 20-23.
25. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
26. Id.
27. See infra note 30.
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B. The "Taking" Issue and Inverse Condemnation
Governments may effectuate a "taking" of private property in the follow-
ing two ways: (1) directly taking the property by exercising the power of
eminent domain; or (2) enacting land use regulations under the police power
that are held to be unconstitutionally restrictive .2 The traditional means by
which private property is taken for public use is by a formal condemnation
proceeding brought by a governmental entity pursuant to its power of eminent
domain. 29 When the governmental entity fails to initiate formal condemnation
proceedings prior to the taking, the landowner may bring an action for
"reverse" or "inverse" condemnation. 0 Inverse condemnation actions are
based on the self-executing character of the fifth amendment's just compen-
sation clause." The condemnation process is called "inverse" because it is
initiated by the landowner rather than by the government.32 Instead of the
government initiating a formal eminent domain proceeding, an inverse con-
demnation action is brought by a landowner to compel compensation for
an alleged defacto taking of their land.3 Traditionally, inverse condemnation
suits were limited to situations where a government entity caused a physical
invasion of a landowner's property.34 Thus, the question whether an inverse
condemnation action should be allowed where the governmental action is a
28. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 398 (1922).
29. Precisely what constitutes a public use or a public purpose is an independent topic of
debate in the law of eminent domain. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (construing
public use clause of fifth amendment and holding that fifth amendment does not permit taking
of private property for subsequent private redevelopment).
30. The Supreme Court has defined inverse condemnation as "a short hand description of
the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking when condemnation
proceedings have not been instituted." United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980). See
Kratovil, supra note 23, at 589 (tracing origins of inverse condemnation and noting that actions
for inverse condemnation were recognized as early as 1882).
31. The United States Constitution's proscription on uncompensated takings is "self-exe-
cuting." No further statutory authorization is required to permit inverse condemnation suits.
United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 54
(1933).
32. See San Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 638 n.2 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (action termed "inverse" because landowner, rather than government,
initiates the proceeding).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)
(cable television attachment constitutes taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
180 (1979) (requirement that access to private pond remain open to public without compensation
constitutes taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) (compensable taking due
to destruction of chicken farm because chickens flew into walls when frightened by aircraft
noise); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1872) (inverse condemnation
award for physical invasion through flooding attributed t6 government). See generally Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 46-48 (1964) (discussing traditional physical
invasions test for taking).
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regulatory invasion, as opposed to a physical invasion of property rights,
lies at the core of the current debate. 35
In addition to a direct taking of private property via exercise of the
eminent domain power, a government may indirectly effectuate a taking by
regulatory action pursuant to its police power. 36 Regulatory takings do not
involve physical invasions of land; rather, they are imposed through govern-
mentally legislated restrictions that limit a property's use.37 The concept of
regulatory takings may be traced back to the landmark 1922 Supreme Court
decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.3s The Pennsylvania Coal Court
recognized that land use regulations enacted pursuant to the police power
may constitute a taking if the effect of the regulation infringes upon the
beneficial use and enjoyment of private property to an unconstitutional
degree.3 9 Justice Holmes's majority opinion stated that "the general rule ..
. is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking." 4 Justice Holmes's statement
resulted in what one commentator has described as the "continuum theory,"
in which police power and eminent domain are differentiated by degree
rather than kind.
4 1
Courts and scholars have long struggled with the problem of determining
the precise point where an exercise of police power "goes too far" and
becomes an uncompensated and unconstitutional taking of the regulated
property.42 While the Supreme Court has yet to agree upon any ascertainable
35. San Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 637-62 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
36. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 396 (1922).
37. Id. at 395.
38. 260 U.S. 393. In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court considered the validity of a statute that
prevented the holder of subsurface mining rights from mining in a manner that caused surface
dwellings to subside. The Court found this regulation to be so restrictive of the coal company's
use of its property that it amounted to an unconstitutional de facto taking. Declaring the
regulation to be void, the Court did not discuss the issue of damages since the state, which
had enacted the regulation, was not a party to the instant suit between the coal company and
the owner of a residence. Id.
39. Id. at 415. In an earlier decision, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 393 (1922), the Court
held that a land use regulation under the police power is distinct from a physical taking under
the power of eminent domain. The Court denied the landowner relief on the grounds that the
regulation, a prohibition on the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages, was within the
police power and did not prevent the landowner from using his brewery for lawful purposes.
While Mugler distinguished the police power and the power of eminent domain, Pennsylvania
Coal placed these two powers on a continuum and indicated that a police power regulation can
constitute a taking. For an analysis of the two decisions, see Sax, supra note 34, at 38-46.
40. 260 U.S. at 415.
41. Bayerd, Inverse Condemnation and the Alchemist's Lesson: You Can't Turn Regulations
into Gold, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 171, 173 (1981).
42. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that no set formula exists for establishing a
regulatory taking. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1979);
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
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formula, it considers the following factors when determining whether a
regulation has effectively become an unconstitutional taking: (1) whether any
beneficial use remains; (2) whether any economic value remains; (3) whether
any investment-backed expectations are thwarted; (4) whether the government
is in effect attempting to acquire a property's use without payment; and (5)
whether any direct legal constraints are placed upon the property.4 3 It must
be kept in mind, however, that the relative ease or difficulty of establishing
a de facto taking determines the relevancy of the compensation question,
because it is only when a de facto regulatory taking is established that a
court is properly confronted with the question of a proper remedy.4
C. The Question of the Proper Remedy
As opposed to the more expansive issue of when land use regulations
constitute de facto takings of private property, this Comment is primarily
concerned with the narrower question of what remedy may be allowed once
a court determines that such a taking has occurred. 4 Traditionally, the
43. See Note, Inverse Condemnation: Valuation of Compensation in Land Use Regulatory
Cases, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 621, 630 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Inverse Condemnation]
(listing factors which courts examine to determine whether regulatory taking has occurred).
44. As one commentator has observed, it is well and good to fashion the proper remedy
for a taking, but if the doctrine or test for a taking is unworkable or weak, the court has built
a boat without a sail. See Stoebuck, San Diego Gas: Problems, Pitfalls and a Better Way, 25
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 24 (1983).
45. Although the focus of this Comment is upon whether monetary compensation in the
form of an inverse condemnation remedy is required by the fifth amendment, it must be noted
that an alternative statutory action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp.
1985), is available for landowners seeking monetary relief for a government's invasion of their
constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id.
A complete analysis of the § 1983 action is not within the scope of this Comment. Nonetheless,
a number of issues regarding this alternative means of relief must be noted. First, because
"damages" are being recovered in a § 1983 action, broader financial relief is possible. Specif-
ically, consequential damages should be recoverable under § 1983, but are generally not available
where constitutionally required just compensation is awarded for a taking. The exception, of
course, is that consequential damages may be allowed in states with constitutions providing for
compensation when property is taken or damaged.
Second, while attorneys' fees and costs have been held unrecoverable in a direct action
brought under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond
Redev. Agency, 561 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1977), successful § 1983 litigants may, at the court's
discretion, recover reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988
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remedies available to landowners have been limited to equitable relief.4 6 Such
relief has taken the form of injunctions against the enforcement of the
offending ordinance, writs of mandamus, or declaratory judgments.4 7 How-
ever, landowners are more frequently arguing that this type of relief is
inadequate.48 These landowners seek to have the courts extend a compen-
sation remedy by allowing inverse condemnation claims where a regulatory
taking is alleged.4
9
1I. INVALIDATION OR COMPENSATION: WHICH IS THE PROPER REMEDY?
Should financial compensation be available to landowners subject to un-
constitutionally restrictive land use regulations, or is invalidation of the
(1976).
Additionally, unsettled issues in § 1983 liability exist with respect to immunities. In Monell
v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978), the Supreme Court held
that municipalities are "persons" and are thus subject to liability under the Civil Rights Act.
Further, in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980), the Court held that
municipalities are not immune from § 1983 damages actions merely because their officials may
have acted in good faith. Thus, municipal liability under § 1983 is firmly established. However,
states continue to enjoy eleventh amendment immunity from such suits. Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332 (1979). Consequently, the current law governing immunities in § 1983 actions is
disadvantageous to local governments. Unlike the states, local governments have no eleventh
amendment protection from civil rights actions for damages for land use regulations. Issues
regarding the resolution of these inequities are unsettled. See infra note 121. Finally, issues of
federal court abstention from deciding local land use questions and of exhaustion of state
remedies may confront the landowner bringing a § 1983 action in federal court. For a discussion
of the exhaustion and abstention issues in the § 1983 land use context, see Wright, Damages
or Compensation for Unconstitutional Land Use Regulations, 37 ARK. L. RaV. 612, 629 (1983).
For discussions on the increasing use of § 1983 in land use battles, see Bley, Use of the Civil
Rights Acts to Recover Money Damages for the Overregulation of Land, 14 URB. LAW. 223
(1982); Pearlman, Section 1983 and the Liability of Local Officials for Land Use Decisions, 23
URB. L. ANN. 57 (1982); Rockwell, Constitutional Violations in Zoning: The Emerging Section
1983 Damage Remedy, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 168 (1981); Note, The Availability of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 in Challenges of Land Use Planning Regulations: A Developer's Dream Come True? 1982
UTAH L. REV. 571.
46. See, e.g., Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 593-94, 350
N.E.2d 381, 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976)
(holding that burdensome zoning does not constitute compensable taking, but amounts to
deprivation of property rights and therefore invalidation is only proper remedy).
47. Id.
48. See infra note 5 1.
49. The monetary relief awarded in an inverse condemnation action for overly restrictive
land use controls is often described by courts and commentators both as "compensation" and
as "damages." This semantic duality can be conceptually misleading. Courts and commentators
using both "damages" and "compensation" interchangeably in the inverse condemnation
context clearly are referring to constitutionally required just compensation and not merely
reimbursement for loss as in tort liability. Hence, it is suggested that such use of the term
"damages" is inappropriate unless reference is being made to a § 1983 recovery and that
conceptual clarity demands that the landowner's monetary award in inverse condemnation
actions be referred to as "compensation" and not "damages."
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offending ordinance the proper remedy? Opposing constitutional interpre-
tations, as well as competing policy considerations, are at the core of this
debate.1 While both state and federal courts have confronted the question,
their responses vary from almost completely prohibiting an award of mon-
etary compensation to openly endorsing such relief.5
Since the 1922 Supreme Court decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,5 2 six regulatory inverse condemnation cases have reached the United
States Supreme Court. 3 In each of these cases, the Court has avoided
resolving the issue of whether the fifth amendment requires that landowners
subject to regulatory takings are entitled to just compensation or whether
injunctive relief against the future application of the regulation is a consti-
tutionally sufficient remedy.5 4 In two cases, Pennsylvania Central Transport
Co. v. New York" and Agins v. City of Tiburon5 6 the Court decided that
50. In considering inverse condemnation-type claims arising from interference with private
property rights by the federal government, the Supreme Court has sanctioned compensatory
relief to avoid invalidating government regulations and frustrating public policy. See, e.g.,
Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932).
Note, however, that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976), provides congressional author-
ization for the payment of compensation for federal government activity that impinges on
private property rights.
51. Some jurisdictions flatly refuse to award compensation and hold that invalidation of
.the offending ordinance is the sole remedy when the government unduly restricts land use. See
Davis v. Prima County, 121 Ariz. 343, 590 P.2d 459 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942
(1978); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1980); Fred
F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5
(1976).
Other states are receptive to compensation claims. See, e.g., Clifton v. Berry, 244 Ga. 78,
259 S.E.2d 35 (1979); Pratt v. State Dept., 309 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1981); Burrows v. City of
Keene, 432 A.2d 15 (N.H. 1981); Village of Willoughby Hills v. Carrigan, 29 Ohio St. 2d 39,
278 N.E.2d 658, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 919 (1972); City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 398
(Tex. 1978); Zinn v. State, 334 N.W.2d 67 (Wis. 1983). At the same time, a growing number
of federal courts are recognizing a monetary compensation remedy under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. See Yuba v. Goldfields, 723 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Scott v. Grenville Co.,
716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1982); Devines v. Maer, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981). See infra note
53.
52. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
53. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Pennsylvania Central Transp. Co. v. New York,
438 U.S. 104 (1978); Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1971).
54. See infra notes 55-65.
55. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In Pennsylvania Central, the landowner was denied permission to
build a skyscraper above Grand Central Station, which had been designated a landmark under
New York City's landmark preservation law, and sought compensation for a temporary taking
as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. Under the New York law, the owners of designated
historic properties could transfer development rights to neighboring parcels of land under the
same ownership as the transferring historic site. Affirming the New York Court of Appeals
decision upholding the law, the United States Supreme Court held that there was no compensable
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no taking could be established on the facts presented. Thus, the Court never
reached the compensation issue." In a third case, Lake County Estates v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,5" the Court remanded for reconsideration
of the regulatory officials' statutory immunities.A9
In the three most recent cases, the Supreme Court has avoided reaching
the merits of the compensation issue by dismissing the cases on finality and
ripeness grounds. In San Diego Gas & Electric v. City of San Diego,60 the
taking. The Court reasoned that even though permission to construct an office building above
the station was denied, the restrictions imposed were substantially related to the promotion of
the general welfare, and not only permitted reasonable beneficial use of the station itself, but
also afforded opportunities to enhance other properties near the station. Id. at 138. Applying
the "continuum" analysis in determining whether the regulation had effected a taking, the
Pennsylvania Central Court emphasized the "economic impact of the regulation on the claim-
ant" and the "character of the governmental action." Id. Significantly, the Court noted that
if future circumstances changed "so that the terminal ceases to be economically viable, the
Appellants may obtain relief." Id. at 138 n.36.
56. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). In Agins, the landowners had purchased an undeveloped five-acre
parcel in one of California's most exclusive coastal suburbs for residential development purposes.
Subsequently, the city enacted an open space zoning ordinance that restricted development of
the parcel to only one to five single family homes. Without first submitting a development plan
to the city, the owners brought a regulatory inverse condemnation action contending that the
rezoning of such valuable land to excessively low density destroyed the value of the property.
The California Supreme Court ruled that no compensation could be recovered in inverse
condemnation for overly restrictive police power regulations and limited the remedy available
to landowners in such cases to declaratory relief or mandamus to invalidate the offending
ordinance. Id. at 262-63. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that no taking had occurred
since appellants were free to pursue their reasonable investment expectations by submitting a
development plan to the city. Id. Because the case was decided on the basis that appellant's
failure to seek alternative relief precluded a finding of the requisite regulatory taking, the
compensation issue was left unresolved by the Court. However, the majority opinion offered
one morsel on the taking issue by stating that mere fluctuations in value during the process of
governmental decision-making, absent extraordinary delay, are incidents of ownership and
cannot be considered a taking in the constitutional sense. Id. at 263 n.9.
57. Between Pennsylvania Central and Agins, the Court decided three taking cases, yet
avoided clarifying the compensation issue in each of the three decisions. In Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51 (1979), the Court held that federal statutes prohibiting transactions in bald eagle
feathers or parts were not a taking of the defendants' property. Next, in Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), the Court held that the United States government cannot require
the owner of a private marina who dug a channel to navigable waters to open the channel to
public navigation without compensation. Although the case did not actually involve an eminent
domain problem, the Court noted that requiring public access to the channel would have been
a taking. Id. at 173. Finally, in Webbs Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155
(1980), the Court held that a Florida statute that gave local courts interest earned on certain
funds deposited in their registries amounted to a taking of the depositors' property.
58. 440 U.S. 391 (1971).
59. In Lake County Estates, the Court considered only the question of immunities available
to the Planning Agency and its governing body members under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 405.
On remand, the district court held that if there is no power of eminent domain, there can be
no liability under § 1983. Jacobson v. Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agency, 474 F. Supp. 901 (D. Nev.
1979).
60. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
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majority concluded that the California Court of Appeals had not decided
whether a taking had in fact occurred, and hence the absence of a final state
court judgment deprived the Court of jurisdiction and required dismissal of
the appeal. 61 Similarly, in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
V. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,62 the Court ruled that the regulatory
taking claim was premature since the developers had not exhausted their
administrative remedies by applying for a variance and pursuing state com-
pensation procedures. 63 Most recently, in MacDonald, Sommer, & Frates v.
Yolo County,64 the Court avoided the compensation issue by ruling that
absent a final determination by the County Planning Commission as to how
it would apply the challenged regulations to the property in question, the
Court could not determine whether a taking had occurred and whether just
compensation was due.65
A. The Constitutional Debate
The manner in which the compensation issue is defined ultimately shapes
the controversy over what remedy is legally proper. Two opposing consti-
tutional interpretations are involved in the debate over the proper remedy
in regulatory takings cases. First, the compensation view holds that the fifth
amendment's just compensation clause requires payment of just compensa-
tion to landowners subject to regulatory takings. 66 Second, the invalidation
view holds that government regulation of land pursuant to the police power
61. Id. at 663.
62. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
63. In San Diego, a majority of the Court concluded that the California courts had not
decided whether any taking had in fact occurred, and that the absence of a final state court
judgment required dismissal of the appeal. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
64. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986). In Yolo County, a land development group brought an inverse
condemnation claim alleging that by (1) downzoning their forty-four acre parcel of land located
in Yolo County, California, to permit only agricultural use; (2) denying the developers access
to existing streets; and (3) refusing to provide water, sewage, and police and fire protection
services to the site, defendants effected an unconstitutional taking of their property for which
compensation was due under the fifth amendment. The developers argued that the land was
unsuitable for farming due to insect infestation and the removal of the topsoil from the site
by state highway crews for construction of an overpass, and hence the regulation appropriated
the entire economic use of the property. The California district court ruled that monetary
compensation for inverse condemnation was foreclosed by Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.
3d 226, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The California
Court of Appeals affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied appellant's petition for
hearing. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court failed to reach the merits of the
compensation issue. The Court held that because the County Planning Commission had not
made a final determination as to how it would apply the challenged regulation to the property,
the Court could not determine whether a taking had occurred and whether compensation was
due. 106 S.Ct. at 2568-69.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra note 90.
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cannot give rise to financial liability, and, therefore, injunctive relief or
invalidation of the offending ordinance is the proper remedy.67
The compensation view is based upon the express language of the fifth
amendment's just compensation clause. The language of the fifth amendment
prohibits the taking of private property for public use without payment of
just compensation. 6 As soon as private property has been taken, either by
formal condemnation proceedings or by physical invasion or regulation, the
landowner suffers a constitutional violation, and the self-executing character
of the just compensation clause is triggered. 69 Essentially, the compensation
view argues that the just compensation requirement of the fifth amendment
is not precatory; once a regulatory taking is found, compensation must be
paid to the landowner. 70 To support the application of the express language
of the fifth amendment to the context of land use regulation, advocates of
the compensation view rely upon Justice Holmes's declaration in Pennsyl-
vania CoaP' that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking. 72 Literally con-
strued, this statement suggests that the excessive police power regulation
becomes a defacto exercise of the eminent domain power with a concomitant
right to compensation under the fifth amendment.
The opposing position, the invalidation view, argues that the term "tak-
ing" is a misnomer. 73 This position contends that the taking clause of the
fifth amendment is not applicable to governmental regulatory action as
opposed to other governmental actions, such as physical invasions of private
property. 74 Under the invalidation view the appropriate constitutional test to
67. See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALEs & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973) (advo-
cating due process or invalidation view that government regulation of land under police power
cannot constitute taking for which compensation is due; as invalid exercises of police power,
only proper remedy is invalidation of offending regulation). Cf. Costonis, Fair Compensation
and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 102 (1975) (proposing that regulation be viewed as neither exercise of police
power nor as taking, but as exercise of "accommodation power" that would require government
to offer "fair compensation" for regulation that "goes too far").
68. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See supra note 23.
69. See supra note 31.
70. See, e.g., 450 U.S. at 655 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
72. Id. at 415.
73. See Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. New York, 39 N.Y.2d at 594, 350 N.E.2d at 385, 385
N.Y.S.2d at 9 (1976) (word "taking" used metaphorically in Pennsylvania Central; "gravaman
of the constitutional challenge" in such cases is that regulation is invalid exercise of police
power under due process clause).
74. See, e.g., Davis v. Prima County, 121 Ariz. 343, 590 P.2d 459 (Ct. App. 1979); Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979); Kasser v. Dade
Dounty, 344 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1977); Ventures Property v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, 594
P.2d 671 (1979); McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. 1980).
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be applied to excessive land use regulations is substantive due process.75 If
a land regulation under the police power is a reasonable means of attaining
a proper public goal, it should be upheld regardless of the economic losses
that the regulation imposes upon some landowners. 76 Accordingly, it is argued
that the term "taking" can only be used in a metaphorical sense to refer to
the outer limit of valid exercises of the police power. 77 Regulations exceeding
this boundary are characterized as constituting deprivations of property
without due process of law and not as takings in violation of the just
compensation clause. 78 Advocates of this view argue that compensation is
not required for regulations that deprive landowners of a property interest
without due process of law. In this view, the property owner's remedy is
limited to invalidation of the unconstitutional regulation. 79
Two state court decisions illustrate the view that invalidation is the proper
remedy. In Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 80 a New
York court found that by rezoning private parks in a residential complex as
open exclusively to the public, New York City deprived the owners of the
reasonable economic use of their property. 81 Rejecting the plaintiff's inverse
condemnation claim, the French court held that in all but exceptional cases,
such as where governments intend to actually acquire land, excessive zoning
regulation does not constitute a constitutionally compensable "taking. 8 2
The court ruled that zoning under the police power was "only metaphori-
cally" a taking, amounting simply to a deprivation of property rights without
due process of law.83
The California Supreme Court further endorsed the invalidation view in
Agins v. City of Tiburon.84 The court ruled that compensation is not
available, under any circumstances, in cases of government regulation of
private property. 85 The Agins court held that a landowner alleging a zoning
ordinance had deprived him of substantially all use of his land may "not
75. See Stoebuck, supra note 44, at 41 (arguing that by interpreting "too far" language
used in Pennsylvania Coal as metaphor for lack of substantive due process, courts will avoid
many problems associated with just compensation).
76. See F. BOSSELsA, supra note 67, at 238-55 (arguing that regulation of use of land, if
reasonably related to valid public purpose, can never constitute taking).
77. See, e.g., Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, (1976), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 226, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255
(1980).
78. 24 Cal. 3d at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
79. Id.
80. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
81. Id. at 594, 350 N.E.2d at 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447
U.S. 255 (1980).
85. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
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elect to sue in inverse condemnation and thereby transmute an excessive use
of the police power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent
domain must be paid." 8 6 Thus, the Agins court limited the remedies available
to landowners subject to unconstitutionally restrictive land use regulations
to declaratory relief or mandamus to invalidate the offending regulation.17
Reviewing the California Supreme Court's decision in Agins, the United
States Supreme Court failed to reach the merits of the inverse condemnation
claim.8 " The Court found that the city's open-space zoning ordinance, which
restricted development of the plaintiff's previously purchased five-acre tract
to only one to five single family homes, did not constitute a taking. 9 Hence,
the Court did not consider whether a state may limit the remedies available
to landowners subject to a regulatory taking.
The compensation position has gained increasing acceptance among the
courts in recent years. Basically, the compensation view advocates that
excessive government regulation of private property constitutes a de facto
taking of the property with a concomitant right to payment under the fifth
amendment.9° In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,9' five
Supreme Court justices sanctioned, the award of monetary compensation to
landowners subject to unconstitutionally restrictive land use regulations. 92
Although a majority of the Court felt that the absence of a final state court
judgment required dismissal of the appeal, 9 Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell, disagreed and reached the merits in
an extensive and now celebrated dissenting opinion. 94 Additionally, in a
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980).
89. Id. The ordinance applied to one of California's most expensive suburban areas. See
supra note 56.
90. Since the San Diego decision, a number of state supreme courts have recognized Justice
Brennan's interim compensation approach. See Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505
(N.D. 1983); Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981); Pratt v. State, 309
N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1981); Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983). In addition,
a number of federal courts of appeals have recognized the Brennan dissent as expressing the
view of the Supreme Court on the compensation issue. See Yuba v. Goldfields, 723 F.2d 884
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983);
Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476, 482 n.5 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Aircrash in Bali, 684 F.2d
1301, 1311 n.7 (9th Cir. 1982); Fountain v. Metro Atlanta R.T.A., 678 F.2d 1038, 1043 (11th
Cir. 1982); Scott v. Greenville Co., 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983); Hernandez v. City of
Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982); Devines v. Maier,
665 F.2d 138, 152 (7th Cir. 1981); Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 664 F.2d 99 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 973 (1983). But see Citadel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Hwy. Auth.,
495 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1982) (denying compensation for unconstitutional freeze on development).
91. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
92. Id. at 622. Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices Burger, White,
Rehnquist and Stevens joined in the majority.
93. Id. at 633.
94. Id. at 654 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist manifested agreement with "much of
what is said in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan.'' 9
The San Diego dissent considered the mandatory, self-executing nature of
the fifth amendment's just compensation clause and concluded that once a
court establishes that a regulatory taking has occurred, the Constitution
demands that the regulatory entity pay just compensation to the owner of
the affected land. 96 The Fred F. French and Agins position that excessive
land use regulations are "metaphorical" takings and are to be challenged as
invalid exercises of the police power under the due process clause was sharply
rejected by Justice Brennan as "tampering with the express language" of
the Constitution.97 If Justice Rehnquist's concurrence is interpreted as evi-
dence that he favors awarding compensation for regulatory takings, at least
four justices on the current Court are in agreement with the position outlined
in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion. 9s
While solidly grounded in the Constitution, Justice Brennan's philosoph-
ically principled civil libertarian approach to protecting individual rights
from excessive encroachment by the state is evident. Justice Brennan con-
cluded that mere invalidation falls far short of fulfilling the fundamental
purpose of the just compensation clause since individual property owners
are forced to bear burdens that should be borne by the public as a whole. 99
Emphasizing fairness, Justice Brennan reasoned that payment of compen-
sation by the government to the landowner for any economic loss suffered
during the time the property was taken operates to redistribute the economic
costs from the individual to the public."°° Viewed broadly, Justice Brennan's
dissent in San Diego, combined with the growing number of state and federal
circuit courts awarding compensation,10 1 evidences a movement towards hold-
ing governments more accountable for land use restrictions that unconsti-
tutionally infringe upon private property rights. Perhaps this posture is best
summed up by Justice Brennan's aphorism: "After all, if a policeman must
know the Constitution, then why not a planner?" 1 0 2
95. Id. at 633 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 655 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 650 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. Since the San Diego decision, Justice O'Connor has replaced Justice Stewart. Conse-
quently, of the original four dissenters in San Diego Gas, only three remain on the Court.
Considering Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in San Diego, it is probable that at least four
Justices on the current Court favor a compensation remedy. Justice O'Connor's position on
this issue remains unknown. During the time she was on the Arizona Court of Appeals, she
did not write or sign an opinion revealing her views on the compensation issue.
99. 450 U.S. at 657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. See supra note 90.
102. 450 U.S. at 661 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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B. Competing Policy Concerns
Persuasive policy arguments support both the invalidation and the com-
pensation positions. 03 Certainly, the ultimate resolution of the controversy
over the proper remedy for regulatory takings must involve a careful bal-
ancing of the public and private interests. The essence of the policy concerns
on both sides can be stated briefly. Advocates of the invalidation position
express three basic concerns regarding a damages remedy. First, courts as
well as commentators contend that the possibility of financial liability will
inhibit land use planning and unduly "chill" government exercise of regu-
latory powers."°4 Second, large and unexpected judgments against local gov-
ernments may deprive essential governmental programs of needed funds and
plunge local governments into bankruptcy.105 Third, the invalidation remedy
is adequate when accompanied by affirmative relief, such as an order to
rezone in a prescribed manner or an order to issue a permit.'6
In addition, some courts adopting the invalidation position advance a
judicial deference rationale.107 In these decisions, the courts argue that the
legislature imposes police power regulations with the expectation that the
private property interests affected will not be compensated. 0 It is contended
that any judicial imposition of financial liability would usurp the legislature's
prerogative to determine whether the policy behind the regulation justifies
the cost of compensation.'0 9 Further, it is pointed out that invalidation gives
a regulatory entity the option of discontinuing the restrictive regulation or
amending it to conform to constitutional limits if it is determined that the
public objective to be achieved is not worth the price of a formal eminent
domain proceeding." 10
In contrast, those endorsing a compensation remedy advance the following
arguments. First, they argue that the possibility of liability will only en-
103. For a summary of the policy arguments on both sides of the compensation debate, see
Johnson, Compensation for Invalid Land Use Regulations, 15 GA. L. REV. 559 (1981).
104. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276, 598 P.2d 25, 30, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372, 377 (1979) (threat of compensation "would have a chilling effect upon the exercise
of police regulating powers at a local level" and also impose excessive financial burdens on
local governments).
105. Id. See Baumgardeman, Takings Under the Police Power, 30 Sw. L.J. 723, 738 (1976).
106. Cf. Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTrNGS CONST. L.Q.
491, 515 (1981) (arguing that difficulty with compensation remedy is that it attaches single
remedy to constitutional violation that can be overcome equally effectively with injunctive
relief).
107. Davis v. Prima County, 121 Ariz. 343, 345, 590 P.2d 459, 461, cert. denied, 442 U.S.
942 (1978); Ventures Property v. Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, 703, 594 P.2d 671, 677 (1979); Gary
D. Reihart, Inc. v. Township of Carroll, 487 Pa. 461, 466, 409 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1979).
108. See, e.g., Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377 ("it seems
[a] usurpation of legislative power for a court to force [payment of] compensation").
109. Id.
110. See Kasser v. Dade County, 344 So. 2d 928, 929 (Fla. 1977); McShane v. City of
Faribault, 292 N.W.2d. 253, 259 (Minn. 1980).
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courage responsibility in the enactment of regulations."' Indeed, given the
stringent requirements necessary to establish a taking, a damages remedy
would impose only a minimal fiscal threat on good faith planning." 2 Second,
the fiscal disaster predictions are overstated and should not deter a court
from giving appropriate relief for constitutional violations." 3 Third, the
invalidation remedy is inadequate because the landowner continues to be
exposed, even after judgment, to harassment in the form of new enactments
only slightly different from the invalidated regulation." 4 Thus, it is said that
invalidation without compensation is a "toothless tiger," capable of great
roars about deprivation of constitutional property rights but ineffective in
guarding against multiple regulatory excesses. " '
Furthermore, proponents of the compensation view argue that there is no
difference between regulatory and non-regulatory takings that should affect
entitlement to a compensation remedy." 6 Hence, invalidation is unfair since
the landowner is forced to pay for the public benefit served by the restric-
tion."' Nullifying the offending restriction does not compensate the land-
owner for the deprivation of his property rights during the interim period
between the regulation's enactment and its ultimate invalidation. Essentially,
advocates of the compensation remedy argue that invalidation falls far short
of satisfying the constitutional requirements of just compensation."'
Invalidation is clearly an insufficient remedy from the landowner's per-
spective. As Justice Holmes wrote, it is important to guard against "the
danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
111. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-51, 656 (1979); Burrows v. City
of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981); Kraft v. Malone, 313 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1981);
City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978).
112. See Comment, supra note 19, at 732 (arguing that compensation would impose minimal
fiscal threat on good faith planning and that effect might be healthy incentive to responsible
regulating).
113. Id.
114. See San Diego, 450 U.S. at 655 n.22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that invalidation
does not prevent enactment of subsequent unconstitutional regulations and attacking attitudes
of some regulatory government officials that "[i]f all else fails, merely amend the regulation
and start over again"). See also Burrows v. City of Keene, 432 A.2d 15, 20 (1981) (compensation
remedy is only way to prevent harassment by repeated amendments amounting to ongoing
restrictions).
115. See Comment, supra note 19, at 734.
116. See San Diego, 450 U.S. at 654 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that once regulatory
taking is found, fifth amendment demands that compensation be paid to landowner). But see
Mandelker, supra note 106, at 498 (rejecting "compensation syllogism" that compensation is
automatically required whenever constitutional taking occurs).
117. See San Diego, 450 U.S. at 656-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (compensation remedy
properly redistributes cost of public benefit served by regulation, which in fairness should be
borne by public).
118. See Comment, supra note 19, at 736 (author observes that invalidation approach is akin
to saying that only remedy available to victim of assault is judicial declaration that assailant
ought to cease his unlawful ways . . .or indeed only start throwing different punches).
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condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than
the constitutional way of paying for the change."" 9 As a number of com-
mentators have pointed out, allowing a landowner to sue for both invali-
dation and compensation for the period during which the regulation was
enforced would considerably reconcile the opposing policy arguments.2 0 In
this manner, government regulatory entities would be forced to consider
seriously the economic impact of proposed land use regulations on land-
owners.' 2 1 At the same time, governments would retain adequate freedom to
exercise police power authority to control land use.
III. PARAMETERS OF A COMPENSATION REMEDY
The parameters of a regulatory inverse condemnation compensation rem-
edy are unclear. Specifically, the application of the compensation formula
proposed by Justice Brennan in his San Diego dissent involves the notion of
a temporary taking as opposed to the permanent, full market value takings
traditionally associated with inverse condemnation claims. Moreover, al-
though the constitutional rule proposed by Justice Brennan provides a doc-
trinal framework for a compensation remedy, modifications on the Brennan
formula, such as the development of procedural prerequisites to compensa-
tion actions, must be anticipated and evaluated.
A. The "Temporary Taking": Interim as Opposed to Permanent
Compensation
Implicit in a traditional inverse condemnation claim is the notion that the
governmental action has affected a permanent taking of private property for
public purposes. Consequently, the government would be obligated to pay
the full fair market value as if it had formally condemned the regulated
property. In contrast, a modified inverse condemnation remedy, based on a
"temporary taking" of the property and requiring "interim compensation"
119. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
120. See Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for "Regulatory Takings", 8
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517, 543 (1981). See also, Comment, supra note 19, at 746.
121. The issue of a state regulatory entity's immunity under the eleventh amendment is
beyond the scope of this Comment. According to one commentator, the eleventh amendment
has not been a bar to regulatory inverse condemnation suits because either there has been a
legislative waiver of immunity or the constitutional taking clause itself is deemed to be a self-
executing waiver. Manelli, Constitutional Provision Requiring Just Compensation for Taking
or Damaging Private Property is Not Self-Executing, 36 NOTPE DAME LAW. 213-14 (1961). See
Bosselman & Bonder, Potential Immunity of Land Use Control Systems from Civil Rights and
Anti-Trust Liability, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 453 (1981) (examining delegation to local gov-
ernments of state immunity and noting that Court will generally find such delegation only
where there is clearly articulated state policy and where state has retained power to administer
and enforce that policy). For a discussion of federal jurisdiction and the eleventh amendment,
see Note, The Eleventh Amendment's Lengthening Shadow over Federal Subject Matter Juris-
diction: Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 515 (1985).
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for the period the unconstitutional regulation is in effect, has developed as
a middle ground between the often inadequate invalidation remedy.12
In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,123 the utility
company sought the full market value of the property as compensation for
the complete and permanent taking of a 412-acre parcel designated as open
space under San Diego's regulatory plan. In his dissent, Justice Brennan
rejected the utility company's claim for full market value. Brennan stated
that:
Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause empowers a court to order a
government entity to condemn the property and pay its full fair market
value, where the "taking" already effected is temporary and reversible
and the government wants to halt the "taking." Just as government may
cancel condemnation proceedings before passage of title .... it must have
the same power to rescind a regulatory "taking. ' 12
Hence, according to the San Diego dissenters, compensating the landowner
for the full market value of their property is not required when a regulatory
taking is found. Instead, unconstitutionally restrictive land use regulations
may constitute a "temporary" taking for which the government must pay
compensation for the interim period between the date the regulation first
effected a taking and the date the regulation is rescinded or amended. 25
While Justice Brennan's interpretation of the fifth amendment as applied
to regulatory takings does not represent binding precedent, the reasoning is
entirely persuasive. The fact that a regulatory taking may be temporary by
virtue of the government's power to rescind or amend the regulation does
not make it less than a constitutional taking. 2 6 As Justice Brennan observed,
nothing in the just compensation clause suggests that the taking must be
permanent and irrevocable. 2 7 Nor does the temporary character of a regu-
latory taking render compensation for the time of the taking any less
obligatory.12  Moreover, from a policy perspective, a compensation award
for a temporary taking involves less of a "chilling" financial exposure to
regulatory governments than would requiring these regulatory governments
122. See San Diego, 450 U.S. at 637-61. See also D. HAGMAN & J. MIISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS
FOR WIPEOUTS (1978) (arguing that invalidation is insufficient remedy and that fifth amendment
requires payment of compensation for period during which offending regulation is in force).
123. 450 U.S 621 (1981).
124. Id. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. Id. Justice Brennan's repeated reference to legislative repeal or amendment is "mysti-
fying" to one commentator, since a court will presumably invalidate any land use regulation
it finds to be a temporary de facto taking and leave it to the local governing body to decide
whether to formally condemn or adopt a less restrictive regulatory alternative. See Cunningham,
supra note 120, at 537.
126. San Diego, 450 U.S. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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to condemn the affected property, take title, and pay the full market value
of the land. 29
B. Modifications on the Brennan Compensation Formula
It is important to note that the dissenters in San Diego observed that the
Constitution does not embody any specific procedure or form of remedy
and that the courts should be free to experiment within the proposed remedial
framework.130 The development of procedural prerequisites for regulatory
inverse condemnation suits is clearly the most significant area of modification
of the compensation remedy proposed by Justice Brennan in the San Diego
dissent. What remedies must be exhausted prior to bringing a compensation
suit? What state or local procedures must be utilized? Landowner diligence
issues concerning the procedural posture that courts will require of property
owners before they will hear compensation claims will undoubtedly affect
the feasibility of bringing regulatory inverse condemnation actions.
Perhaps the most significant modification of the Brennan Compensation
Formula was introduced by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals two months
after the San Diego decision in Hernandez v. City of LaFayette.'3' In
Hernandez, a city failed for over two years to act on the landowners' rezoning
requests because it feared that rezoning would increase the purchase price
of land it wanted to acquire for a right of way. 3 2 Consistent with the
Brennan Compensation Formula, the Hernandez court ruled that where a
temporary regulatory taking is found, the landowner is entitled to "an
amount equal to the value of the property during the period of the taking."'3
The Hernandez court qualified this general rule by concluding that where
(1) the application of a zoning ordinance to a particular property fails to
initially deny the owner an economically viable use of their land, but later
does result in such a denial due to changing circumstances; or (2) where a
zoning classification initially denies a property owner an economically viable
use, but the owner delays or fails to seek timely relief, a taking does not
occur until "the municipality governing body is given a realistic opportunity
and reasonable time within which to review its zoning legislation vis-a-vis
the particular property and to correct the inequity."' 34 The court reasoned
that the city would lack an intention to deny the landowner an economically
viable use of their property until the city was put on notice that its zoning
regulations were effecting such a denial.13 1
129. Of course, the method that is used to measure such interim compensation will determine
the full extent to which the "chilling effect" of a compensation award will have upon a
regulating government.
130. 450 U.S. at 660 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981).
132. Id. at 1191.
133. Id. at 1200.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1200-01.
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Another qualification on the Brennan Compensation Formula introduced
by the Hernandez court is the suggestion that the landowner must exhaust
his legislative remedies by petitioning the city for a rezoning.' 36 In fashioning
the notice and opportunity to cure exhaustion prerequisites, the Hernandez
court was concerned that landowner delays or the failure to seek timely relief
and possibly increase awards would subject municipalities to unexpected
financial liability.'37
Under the Hernandez modification, compensation does not accrue until
the available legislative remedies have been exhausted. Compensation is
measured from the point that the government is given notice and thereby
made aware of the regulatory taking. Included is a reasonable period of time
to allow the regulatory entity a realistic opportunity to correct the inequity. 
18
This approach seems fair because providing the regulating government with
advance notice of its potential liability imposes little burden upon the land-
owner. At the same time, the landowner's right to compensation is not
compromised in any way, assuming that they give timely notice. Moreover,
allowing the regulating government a reasonable time to correct the offending
regulation is fair as long as the time period allowed is not so unduly long
as to compromise the landowner's right to compensation.
Commentators are divided on the propriety of the Hernandez modification
of the Brennan Compensation Formula. Arguing that government needs to
have its attention focused because it does not always recognize when it has
taken property, one prominent commentator has observed that the Hernandez
modification should eliminate the fear of the "invalidation is the only
remedy" school of thought that government will be paralyzed into inaction
if every imposing regulation results in a compensation award for the land-
owner. 139 Although the commentator agrees that requiring the property owner
to bring the harsh regulation to the attention of the decision-making body
makes sense, he notes that the regulating government's attention can be
focused in a number of ways. It is suggested that a simple letter describing
the harsh effects of the regulation upon the landowner's property would
provide sufficient notice. 140 If proceedings to modify the offending regulation
are not convened within a reasonable time from letter notice, the landowner
should be free to pursue his judicial remedies. Compensation would be
calculated from the date of the letter notice and not the date of the com-
pletion of the exhaustion requirement.' 41 On the other hand, some scholars
contend that the Hernandez exhaustion requirements are contrary to the
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1201.
138. Id. at 1200.
139. Hagman, Temporary or Interim Damage Awards in Land Use Control Cases (Part I),
4 ZONING & PLANNING L. REP. 129, 134 (1981).
140. Id. at 134.
141. Id.
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spirit of Justice Brennan's dissent.1 42 It is argued that delaying compensation
for an undetermined time while the property owner pursues administrative
remedies is irreconcilable with Justice Brennan's view that compensation
must be paid from the date the regulation first effected a taking. 143
Exhaustion requirements such as the Hernandez court imposed upon
Justice Brennan's compensation formula seem to be in accordance with
recent Supreme Court decisions. For instance, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 4
the Court held that where a property owner had not sought approval for
development of their land under the ordinances in question, there was no
taking.' 4 Hence, in Agins, the Court sent the message that local adminis-
trative procedures must be utilized before a regulatory taking claim will be
heard.
The Agins decision seems to have foreshadowed the Court's recent decision
in Williamson Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City. 46 In the Hamilton Bank decision, the Court introduced two procedural
prerequisites to bringing compensation claims under the fifth amendment
that may be viewed as further modifications on Justice Brennan's compen-
sation formula. First, the Court ruled that if a state provides an adequate
procedure for seeking just compensation, landowners cannot claim a violation
of the just compensation clause until the state compensation procedures have
been utilized and just compensation has been denied by the government.'47
Thus, unless a landowner exhausts state compensation remedies, a compen-
sation claim will be "premature. "'4s
The second procedural prerequisite to bringing regulatory inverse condem-
nation claims introduced by the Hamilton Bank Court concerns the ripeness
of regulatory inverse condemnation claims. Specifically, the Court ruled that
regulatory inverse condemnation claims are not ripe until the government
entity charged with implementing the regulation reaches a final decision
regarding the application of the regulation to the particular property in-
volved. 149 The Hamilton Bank Court reasoned that until the regulatory
142. Kimec, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Runs Out of Gas in San Diego, 57
IND. L.J. 45, 61 (1982) (while author admits that one could argue that no taking effected until
administrative process completed, he dismisses "such semantics" as contrary to spirit of Justice
Brennan's opinion).
143. Id.
144. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
145. Id. at 261. In Agins, the city's open space zoning ordinance permitted a development
of between one and five single family residences on the appellant's property. The Court found
that such restrictions advanced the legitimate governmental goals of assuring careful and orderly
development. Thus, the Court held that although the ordinances limited development, they
neither prevented the best use of appellant's land nor extinguished a fundamental attribute of
ownership. Id. See supra note 56.
146. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
147. Id. at 3121.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 3117.
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commission determines that no variances will be granted, it is impossible for
a jury to determine whether a landowner will be unable to derive economic
benefit from the land.5 0 Significantly, the Court applied this reasoning in
its most recent regulatory inverse condemnation case. In MacDonald, Som-
mer & Frates v. Yolo County,'5 the Court affirmed dismissal of a regulatory
inverse condemnation claim on grounds that the County Planning Commis-
sion had not made a final determination as to how it would apply the
regulation to the complainants property.5 2 Restating its Hamilton Bank
reasoning, the Yolo County Court concluded that it could not adjudicate
the constitutionality of the regulations without knowing the exact nature and
extent of the development permitted under the regulations.'53 Hence, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that a landowner must obtain the regulatory
entity's final position regarding how it will apply the regulation to the
particular land before the Court will rule on a claim for regulatory inverse
condemnation.
On the whole, procedural prerequisites or exhaustion requirements such
as the Hernadez court suggested are justified. Under the Hernandez modi-
fication of Justice Brennan's proposed compensation remedy, the regulating
government is provided with advance notice of potential liability. 5 4 At the
same time, the landowner's right to compensation is not compromised,
assuming that they give timely notice of the regulation's harsh impact. Thus,
the Hernandez modification is fair to both parties. Nonetheless, substantial
administrative or legislative exhaustion requirements risk diminishing the
deterrence of the just compensation clause upon overzealous land use reg-
ulation. Allowing the regulating government a reasonable time period to
correct the offending regulation is also fair as long as the time period is
realistic enough to prevent the landowner's right to compensation from being
unduly compromised. Courts must guard against the existing danger that
such exhaustion requirements may violate the constitutional requirement that
a landowner be able to challenge a regulation without being forced to resort
to "unfair procedures in order to recover his due compensation."'"
IV. VALUATION OF THE INTERIM COMPENSATION REMEDY
Given the recent development of a compensation remedy, it is understand-
able that adequate guidelines for calculating compensation awards have not
yet developed. 5 6 The touchstone San Diego case provides only general hints
150. Id.
151. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
152. Id. at 2566.
153. Id. at 2566-67.
154. 105 S. Ct. at 3121.
155. San Diego, 450 U.S. at 660 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156. See Note, Inverse Condemnation, supra note 43, at 621 (noting lack of valuation
standards and proposing modifications to various eminent domain rules for use in regulatory
takings cases).
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regarding the valuation of the proposed interim compensation remedy. Justice
Brennan left the states free to experiment with the details. He simply noted
that the principles for determining the proper measure of just compensation
that are applied in the context of formal condemnation proceedings, occu-
pations and physical invasions should provide guidance to courts awarding
compensation for a regulatory taking. 5
7
The purpose of a just compensation award is to place landowners in the
same position monetarily as they would have occupied had their property
not been taken.'" Therefore, an interim compensation award should reim-
burse the landowner for any losses suffered during the time the offending
regulation was in effect. The dissent in San Diego noted that valuation
principles applied in formal condemnation cases should guide courts in
measuring an interim compensation remedy for regulatory takings. 5 9 In most
eminent domain cases, however, the taking is permanent. Landowners trans-
fer all or part of their property interest to the government, which then pays
fair market value as compensation. 60 In contrast, the interim compensation
award proposed in San Diego contemplates only a "temporary taking. ' '' 6
The regulating government is not required to purchase a permanent interest.
Rather, the government is simply required to pay compensation beginning
on the "date the regulation first effected the taking, and ending on the date
the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regula-
tion." 62 Accordingly, those eminent domain cases involving only a temporary
taking of property interests can provide the foundation for establishing
methods of measuring interim compensation in regulatory inverse condem-
nation cases. Thus focused, at least three separate "temporary taking"
valuation methods must be considered: (1) the rental return method; (2) the
option price method; and (3) the lost profits method. 61
A. Rental Return Method
The rental return method values the compensation for a temporary regu-
latory taking at the rental figure that hypothetically would have been ne-
157. 450 U.S. at 659-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 657-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 659 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160. 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 22, § 1.11.
161. 450 U.S. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. Id. According to the rule proposed in the San Diego dissent, if the regulating government
chooses to continue the offending regulation in force, it must pay "proper measures of just
compensation." Id. at 660 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is important to note, however, that
according to Justice Brennan's compensation rule, the regulating government must still pay
interim compensation for the period during which the regulation was in force, regardless of
whether or not the government rescinds the regulation or elects to continue the regulation in
force and condemn the affected property. Id.
163. See generally Hagman, supra note 139.
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gotiated among private parties as the property's rental value.164 This concept
is best illustrated by two classic temporary taking cases. In Kimball Laundry
Co. v. United States, 6 1 the United States Army took wartime possession of
a laundry business. The United States Supreme Court held that since the
taking was temporary, the proper measure of compensation was the rental
value of the laundry for the three years and seven months the government
had possession.'6 Similarly, in United States v. General Motors Corp.,
67
the government condemned and temporarily occupied a building leased to
the General Motors Corporation. The Court awarded the company the
market rental value at which a long-term tenant would have leased the
property to a temporary tenant for the period of the government's occupation
of the premises. ' Although these cases illustrate the concept of the rental
return measure, it must be noted that regulatory takings do not involve
physical possession of the property. Further, in a regulatory taking the
condemnee normally has some use rights, however limited. As a result, the
rental return compensation award in regulatory takings cases arguably may
be something less than that awarded in Kimball and General Motors, and
less than the term "rent" typically implies. 69
The rental value measure of compensation has been adopted in several
temporary taking cases involving land use regulations. 70 For instance, in
Sixth Camden Corp. v. Evensham,171 the plaintiff developer, after denial of
a variance and an attempted downzoning by the township, sought compen-
sation for a zoning ordinance that precluded construction of a shopping
center on his land. Finding a temporary taking, the court held that "the fair
rental value of the property" was the proper compensation. 7 2 A Texas case
that also adopted rental value as the appropriate compensation measure
added a rather drastic twist. In City of Austin v. Teague,171 the city repeatedly
rejected the plaintiff's application for a waterway development permit. The
landowners were denied all use of their land, and the city acquired a "scenic
164. Kimec, supra note 142, at 80 (advocating rental return measure for interim compensation
awards).
165. 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
166. Id. at 6-7.
167. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
168. Id. at 379-84.
169. See Hagman, supra note 139, at 139.
170. See, e.g., Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evensham, 420 F. Supp. 709, 728-29
(D.N.J. 1976) (finding normal compensation for temporary taking to be fair rental value);
Usdin v. State, 173 N.J. Super. 311, 414 A.2d 280 (1980) (standard of recovery is rental value
calculated in relation to land's most appropriate use (industrial) minus residual value of regulated
use (floodway)). Cf. City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978) (landowner's out-
of-pocket loss standard of recovery applied although court purports generally to adopt rental
value standard).
171. 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976).
172. Id. at 729.
173. 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978).
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easement" without cost. The Texas Supreme Court held that rental value is
the appropriate measure of compensation when landowners are temporarily
deprived of the use of their land . 74 However, the court ruled that the
plaintiff had failed to prove with reasonable certainty that the property
would have produced any rental return at all for the period during which
development was improperly denied. 75 Thus, the Teague court seemed to
"waffle" between rental value and actual value or out-of-pocket loss as the
standard of recovery. 176
Assuming that a hypothetically negotiated rental return for the period of
the taking is the proper measure of interim compensation, an important
secondary question remains regarding the standard by which this rental value
should be determined. While this issue is often ignored by courts, several
choices for measuring interim rental value exist. Rental value may be based
upon the value of the property at its actual level of use; the value of the
property's lowest use or the floor below which the use of the property cannot
be constitutionally restricted; or the value of the property at all available
uses including its highest and best use. 177
The choice of the proper measurement basis for interim rental value is
largely a matter of policy. Nevertheless, the selection of a value standard is
especially important because regulatory takings, unlike formal condemnation,
frequently affect undeveloped land. 7 8 Under formal condemnation practice,
land is valued at its highest and best use, which includes all available uses. 179
The rationale for not limiting condemnation value to the property's existing
or actual use is that the market does not so limit value. This is understandable
given the frequency with which zoning amendments and use variances are
granted. The only restriction on determining potential-use value under present
condemnation practice is that the uses not be so speculative as to command
no market price.8 0
Some commentators advocate adopting these eminent domain rules in
measuring interim rental value in regulatory inverse condemnation cases.' 8 '
In arguing that fairness requires that the landowner be fully compensated
for all interim losses, this position holds that fair rental value should be
determined by considering all economically available uses of the property as
well as the uncertainty costs imposed by the temporary taking, including
174. Id. at 394.
175. Id. at 395.
176. See Kimec, supra note 142, at 64 n.123.
177. Id. at 67.
178. Because undeveloped land is often involved in regulatory inverse condemnation cases,
the actual or existing use standard would seldom be a viable option. L. ORGEL, VALUATION
UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 30 (2d ed. 1953).
179. Id. § 31.
180. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 n.36 (1978).
181. See Kimec, supra note 142, at 72-74.
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increased construction and financing costs.'2 Others advocate measuring
interim rental value at the lowest, most constitutionally restrictive use.183
This standard satisfies the constitutional minimum by supplying the value
increment necessary to cure the regulatory taking. 84 Furthermore, by not
factoring in incidental and consequential losses and limiting the compensation
paid to the most restrictive constitutionally permissible use value, the com-
pensation calculation is greatly simplified. It is argued that so limiting the
landowner's remedy creates a "sounder balance" between private property
rights and public governance interests. 85
B. Option Price Method
The option price method measures interim compensation as the market
value of an option to purchase the land for the period during which the
offending regulation is in force. 8 6 A New Jersey Supreme Court decision
best illustrates this valuation measure. In Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of
Englewood,'7 the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a regulatory
provision that reserved land for a period of one year for possible acquisition
and use as public parks and playgrounds. The court held that the restriction
was valid as long as the city complied with constitutional mandates and paid
just compensation for the temporary taking, despite the fact that the law
failed to expressly provide for compensation.'18
With regard to measuring such compensation, the Lomarch court suggested
that the landowner should receive the value of a one-year "option" to
purchase the land.'8 9 Moreover, the court stated that the option price should
reflect taxes and reasonable engineering expenses incurred in obtaining mu-
nicipal approval of the plat in the event that the municipality should even-
tually take title.19' As noted with respect to the rental value rule, the option
price value may be adjusted to reflect the fact that landowners in regulatory
inverse condemnation cases continue to exercise existing use rights.
C. Lost Profits Method
The lost profits method values the landowner's interim compensation
award at the amount of interest that would have accrued upon the profits
182. Id.
183. See Costonis, Fair Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidote for the
Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1049 n.125 (1975).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 884.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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the landowner would have realized absent the unconstitutional regulation. 91
For instance, in Prince George's Co. v. Blumberg,'92 the plaintiff was granted
permits to build apartment buildings that were later revoked due to neigh-
borhood opposition and environmental considerations. Finding that the rev-
ocation of the plaintiff's building permits was unlawful, the court held that
compensation was appropriate. 93
To calculate this award, the Blumberg court first determined the profit
that the plaintiff would have realized had the project been developed and
sold without the delay caused by the improper permit revocation. 94 The
court then awarded the plaintiff interest on the "undelayed profit" that
would have been earned from the time the property would have been
developed and sold to the date the project could actually be built and sold. 9
While this valuation measure may be criticized as speculative, it is no more
speculative than techniques that courts and juries often utilize in measuring
damage awards in tort cases.
As is evident, several methods are available to measure regulatory inverse
condemnation awards. Courts may base an interim compensation award on
the fair rental value of the property, possibly valued at the most restrictive
constitutionally permissible use. Alternatively, the option price method or a
lost profits approach may be used as a valuation measure. It is unlikely that
strict adherence to any one of these formulas will prove adequate in all land
use cases. Indeed, the propriety of using a particular valuation method will
depend upon the circumstances of a given case. For example, valuing tem-
porary takings involving large scale developments may require a lost profits
approach if it is difficult to ascertain a fair rental or option value for such
a project.
On the other hand, where a ready market for the property exists, the trier
of fact should be able to determine easily fair rental value or the price of
an option based on market conditions. Interestingly, one commentator has
observed that the rental return, option price, and interest on lost profit rules
"may be the same measures masquerading under different labels."' 96 In any
event, courts should remain flexible in selecting an appropriate interim
compensation valuation formula depending upon the particular circumstances
of the case at hand.
CONCLUSION
It is safe to say that "the future is now" with respect to a compensation
remedy for landowners subject to unconstitutionally restrictive land use
191. See Prince George's County v. Blumburg, 44 Md. App. 79, 407 A.2d 1151 (1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 82, 407 A.2d at 1155.
194. Id. at 83-84, 407 A.2d at 1156.
195. Id.
196. See Hagman, supra note 139, at 142.
[Vol. 35:931
SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
regulations. While the interim compensation remedy proposed by Justice
Brennan in his San Diego dissent does not represent binding Supreme Court
precedent, an indirect majority of five Justices of the Supreme Court indicates
that the fifth amendment's just compensation clause may demand that
landowners subject to regulatory takings be compensated. 97 If the just
compensation clause is to have any meaning, a compensation remedy must
be available when a court finds that a land use regulation constitutes a
taking. As Justice Brennan wrote in his dissent in San Diego, a compensation
remedy is "supported by the express words and purpose of the just com-
pensation clause." 198 Equitable remedies such as invalidation simply do not
provide an adequate remedy to those landowners who are forced to bear the
cost of the public benefits accruing from the regulation during the period
of time that the regulation is in force.
The law of regulatory inverse condemnation is currently unsettled. The
repeated failure of the United States Supreme Court to conclusively resolve
the compensation issue has resulted in considerable confusion among state
and federal courts. While some courts allow claims for just compensation
for regulatory takings, other courts flatly refuse to award compensation and
limit the landowner's remedy to invalidation. 199 The obvious unfairness of
the current state of the law to both regulating governments and landowners
necessitates a conclusive resolution of the controversy over the proper remedy
for regulatory takings by the Supreme Court.
Once a court makes the threshold finding of a regulatory taking, the
government should be given an opportunity to mitigate liability by rescinding
the offending regulation. If no settlement is negotiated, the court must
determine the proper form of the constitutionally required just compensation.
According to the compensation remedy proposed by the San Diego dissent,
the government must pay compensation for the temporary taking effected
by the regulation during the interim period between the enactment of the
offending regulation and its rescission or amendment. 200 If the government
chooses to continue the regulation in force, the landowner must be paid
"proper measures of just compensation." In any event, the government may
have the option of formally condemning the property by exercise of its
eminent domain power and paying the full fair market value of the prop-
erty. 201
Compensation for regulatory takings is relatively new to the law. Conse-
quently, there is little precedent to draw upon for guidance in valuing a
compensation remedy. Common law eminent domain rules provide a starting
point for compensation valuation in land use cases. Several approaches for
197. 450 U.S. at 634-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 653-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199. See supra note 51.
200. 450 U.S. at 654-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201. See 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 22, § 1.11.
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measuring interim compensation have been discussed, and this Comment
suggests that courts should have the flexibility to employ any one of these
methods depending upon the particular circumstances of a given case.
To be sure, courts confronted with the multiplicity of unresolved questions
regarding a regulatory inverse condemnation compensation remedy must
proceed carefully.- As the courts take up Justice Brennan's invitation to
experiment with a compensation remedy, however, they must heed his "Con-
stitutional requirement" that the "landowner must be able to meaningfully
challenge a regulation that allegedly effects a taking, and recover just com-
pensation if it does So."202
Thomas E. Schnur
202. 450 U.S. at 661 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
